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William C. Powers, Jr. *
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
.4. Proof of Defectiveness
("YUBSEQ UENT Remedial Measures Under Texas Rule of Evidence
S407. ** The new Texas Rules of Evidence went into effect on Sep-
A3 tember 1, 1983.' Following prior Texas case law, 2 rule 407(a) pro-
vides that evidence of a defendant's post-accident remedial measures is
inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct.3 Rule 407(a) explic-
itly provides, however, that it does not bar this evidence in products liabil-
ity cases based on strict liability.4 Consequently, evidence of post-accident
design changes is admissible to prove the existence of a design defect. In
addition, rule 407(b) provides that evidence of recall letters from manufac-
turers to purchasers is admissible to prove defectiveness. 5
While most courts have agreed that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is normally inadmissible to prove negligence, 6 the use of evi-
dence of subsequent design changes to prove defectiveness in strict prod-
* B.A., University of California (Berkeley); J.D., Harvard University. Professor of
Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
** I am especially grateful to Steven Goode for his help on this and the next section.
I. TEXAS RULES OF COURT 317 (West 1983).
2. See Texas Trunk R.R. v. Ayres, 83 Tex. 268, 270-71, 18 S.W. 684, 685 (1892); Hous-
ton Lighting & Power Co. v. Tabor, 221 S.W.2d 339, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
3. TEX. R. EvI. 407 provides:
(a) Subsequent remedial measures. When, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule
does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control or feasi-
bility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. Nothing in
this rule shall preclude admissibility in products liability cases based on strict
liability.
(b) Notification of defect. A written notification by a manufacturer of any
defect in a product produced by such manufacturer to purchasers thereof is
admissible against the manufacturer on the issue of existence of the defect to
the extent that it is relevant.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Texas's exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures for the purpose of
proving negligence is in accord with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions. See
FED. R. EVID. 407; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275, at 666-67
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ucts liability cases has been a source of controversy. 7 One argument for
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence is
that admitting such evidence would discourage defendants from taking de-
sirable safety precautions. 8 Some courts have reasoned that this rationale
does not apply in strict product liability cases, however, since product
manufacturers have an overwhelming, independent economic reason to
improve their products despite the possible adverse evidentiary impact of
the improvement. 9
A second argument for excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures to prove negligence is that its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion.' 0 Juries may conclude that
(2d ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 283, at 185
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). But see ME. R. EvID. 407.
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible, even in negligence cases, "when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control or feasibility of precaution-
ary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." TEX. R. EVID. 407(a) (emphasis added).
Since rule 407(a) follows previous Texas practice in negligence cases, its effect in negli-
gence cases is not discussed in detail in this survey.
7. In Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1975), the California Supreme Court held that its rule excluding subsequent remedial
measures in negligence cases was not applicable to strict products liability cases. Ault has
been followed by state courts in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793-94
(Alaska 1981); Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 78-80, 565 P.2d 217, 224 (1977);
Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 122-25, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549-50, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251, 255-56 (1981); Shaffer v. Honeywell Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D. 1976); Chart v.
General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680, 683-84 (1977). See also Wyo. R.
EvID. 407 (committee note interprets culpable conduct as not including breach of warranty
or strict liability, citing Ault); COLO. R. EviD. 407 (committee comments); HAWAII R. EVID.
407 (exclusion of subsequent remedial measure evidence not required in products liability
cases on proof of dangerous defect).
The distinction in Ault between negligence cases and products liability cases has been
rejected by state courts in Hallmark v. Allied Prods. Corp., 132 Ariz. 434, 440-41, 646 P.2d
319, 325-26 (1982); Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 83 Mich. App. 373, 268 N.W.2d
656, 660 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J.
Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140, 141 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (per curiam); LaMonica v. Out-
board Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1976); Haysom v. Coleman
Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 573 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1978) (en banc). See also ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (1982) (evidence of subsequent design change not admissible in prod-
ucts liability cases to prove defect); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 (1979) (negligence or culpable
conduct includes manufacture or sale of defective product).
Federal courts have split on the issue of whether evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures is admissible to prove defectiveness in products liability cases. See infra notes 20-28
and accompanying text.
8. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 119, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151,
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975).
9. See id. at 119-20, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16 and cases cited supra
note 5. This reasoning would apply whether the underlying theory of liability is negligence
or strict liability. Conversely, manufacturers are arguably more aware of and influenced by
legal rules than are other types of defendants. Consequently, admitting evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures might discourage product improvements more than some courts
have presumed. I am indebted to Steven Goode for this point.
10. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is clearly proba-
tive on both negligence and defectiveness issues. Although this evidence is not conclusive on
the issue of negligence (since the risks may not have been foreseeable at the time of the
original conduct), conclusiveness is not required for relevance. A decision to change con-




the changes reflect an admission of fault." Also, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures invites a defendant to offer collateral evidence sug-
gesting reasons for the changes other than improved safety, thereby dif-
fusing the focus of the trial. Moreover, evidence of a defendant's post-
accident conduct may divert the jury from the issue of foreseeability. In a
strict products liability case, however, collateral evidence concerning the
defendant's motivation for a post-accident change may not be as diverting
to the jury because foreseeability is normally not a factor in determining
defectiveness. 12
Courts that have declined to treat strict products liability cases differ-
ently from negligence cases for the purpose of admitting evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures have justly criticized these distinctions. 13 Since
rule 407 distinguishes between negligence and strict products liability,
however, Texas courts will be required to understand the rationales for the
distinction to apply the rule properly.
Rule 407 is potentially ambiguous in its treatment of products liability
cases involving warning defects. The exemption within rule 407(a) applies
only to cases based on strict liability. Since Texas courts seem to judge
warning defects according only to risks that were knowable at the time the
product was sold, 14 cases involving warning defects might not be "based
on strict liability." Due to the analytical similarity of warning defects and
negligence, courts might treat them alike for the purpose of excluding evi-
dence of post-accident modifications.' 5
If the distinction in rule 407 between negligence and strict products lia-
bility is based on the premise that product manufacturers are less likely
than other defendants to be deterred from undertaking worthwhile safety
precautions, warning defects should be treated like other types of product
defects. According to this rationale the evidentiary rule is less likely to
discourage product safety improvements regardless of the type of defect.
If, however, the distinction in rule 407 is based on a premise that this evi-
dence may cause unfair prejudice and confusion in proving negligence but
not defectiveness, the appropriate treatment of warning defects is less
clear. Warning defects might be treated like negligence, since in both cases
evidence of subsequent remedial measures may confuse the jury concern-
ing the issue of foreseeability, which is a factor in negligence and warning
I1. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 125, 528 P.2d 1148, 1155, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812, 819 (1975) (Clark, J., dissenting).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 39-58.
13. See, e.g., Granada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 886-88 (5th
Cir. 1983); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1080 (1981). See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text for discussion of Granada
Steel Indus. and other federal court decisions.
14. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Crocker v.
Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974). See infra notes 39-58 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the appropriate standard for judging warning defects.
15. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983); Gra-
nada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 558-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480-81 (1979).
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
defect cases but not in design defect cases. Unlike many subsequent de-
sign modifications cases, however, modifications to product warnings are
seldom motivated by reasons other than safety.16 Consequently, evidence
of a post-accident warning change is less likely to create a collateral dis-
pute concerning the defendant's motivation for making the change. After
choosing between these conflicting rationales, Texas courts might treat
warning defects either like negligence or strict liability for the purpose of
applying rule 407(a).17
Rule 407(b) provides that recall letters and other written notification of
defect are admissible for the purpose of proving the existence of a defect.
Ostensibly, this provision applies without regard to whether the plaintiff's
case is based on negligence or strict products liability. If rule 407(b) were
applicable only to strict liability actions, it would be superfluous, since re-
call letters are implicitly made admissible in strict products liability cases
by the proviso to rule 407(a).18 Moreover, if the rationale for admitting
recall letters is that they are so clearly motivated by the defendant's belief
that its product is unsafe (and therefore the danger of collateral evidence
concerning probative value is remote), the plaintiff's theory of recovery is
irrelevant.' 9 If the rationale is that an evidentiary rule is less likely to
deter a manufacturer than another defendant from taking post-accident
remedial measures, the distinction between negligence and strict liability is
again irrelevant. Consequently, the admissibility of recall letters under
rule 407(b) should not depend on the plaintiffs theory of recovery.
Subsequent Remedial Measures Under Federal Rule of Evidence 407. The
Fifth Circuit considered the admissibility of evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures in products liability cases in Granada Steel Industries, Inc. v.
Alabama Oxygen Co .20 Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which is applicable
16. Instructions for product use, as opposed to direct warnings, might be modified for
nonsafety reasons. By their nature, however, warnings are likely to be motivated only by
safety concerns. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
17. For cases suggesting that warning defects be treated like negligence rather than
strict liability under rules similar to rule 407, see supra note 15.
Even if warning defects are treated like negligence under rule 407, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is admissible to prove "ownership, control or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment." TEX. R. EVID. 407(a) (emphasis added).
18. This assumes that rule 407(b) is not merely redundant. But ME. R. EVID. 407(b)
(the source of the Texas rule) explicitly provides that recall letters are admissible even
though all evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible under the Maine rule.
Since the recall letter provision in the Maine rule is redundant, the Texas provision may also
be redundant.
19. This conclusion suggests that subsequent changes of warnings should also be admis-
sible even if warning defects are governed essentially by negligence. Like recall letters,
warning changes are unlikely to be motivated other than by a belief that the product is
unsafe. The improbability that a manufacturer will be deterred from taking post-accident
safety precautions applies to warning changes as well as to recall letters. The danger of
distracting the jury from the issue of foreseeability is an issue in warning cases, but the
admissibility of recall letters in negligence cases suggests that foreseeability has a limited
role in the application of rule 407. Consequently, the mere fact that foreseeability may also
govern warning defects does not require that rule 407 treat warning defects and negligence
alike.
20. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 38
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in federal courts even in diversity cases based on state substantive law,2 1
provides that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible
to prove the defendant's negligence or culpable conduct.22 Unlike the
Texas rule, the federal rule does not explicitly address strict products lia-
bility or recall letters. Following the majority of other circuit courts that
have faced the issue,23 the Fifth Circuit held that the exclusion provision
of rule 407 applies to strict products liability cases. 24 The court recognized
the reasoning of other courts that the policy encouraging voluntary repairs
applies equally to product manufacturers and other defendants. 25 The
court relied principally, however, on a conclusion that evidence of subse-
quent design changes has little probative value, which is outweighed by a
propensity to confuse and divert the jury. 26
The difference between the Texas rule and the Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the federal rule creates an incentive for forum shopping when evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures is likely to be important. Since
defendants obviously will prefer the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
federal rule, they have an incentive to remove diversity cases from Texas
state courts to federal courts. 27 A plaintiff, however, can prevent removal
21. See FED. R. EvID. 1101(b); Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231,
1238 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 609 F.2d 820, 821
(5th Cir. 1980); Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in
the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1977).
22. When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving. . . feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted ....
FED. R. EvID. 407.
23. See Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v.
Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59-
60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktienges-
sellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. 1980); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134
(Ist Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979). But see Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d
599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980); Oberst v. Int'l Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 867-71 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
The Eighth Circuit excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures in cases involving
warning defects but not in cases involving design defects or manufacturing defects. Com-
pare DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983); with Un-
terburger v. Snow Co., 620 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980).
24. Since the Fifth Circuit held that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inad-
missible in both negligence cases and strict products liability cases, it will be unnecessary for
the court to determine whether warning defects should be treated like negligence or strict
liability. In either case, evidence of subsequent remedial measures would be excluded.
25. 695 F.2d at 887; see, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
26. 695 F.2d at 887-88. The court recognized that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is admissible for the purpose of showing feasibility of precautionary measures.
This requires, however, that feasibility be controverted by the defendant, which was not the
case in Granada Steel. Since the plaintiff had not requested an admission on the issue of
feasibility, the court was not required to decide whether a defendant's refusal to admit feasi-
bility constitutes a per se controversy on the issue of feasibility. Id. at 888-89; see C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5288, at 144 (1980).
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1976).
1984]
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by joining a local retailer or other defendant whose citizenship is not
diverse. 28
Industry Custom. In Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.29 the Fifth Circuit
held that evidence of product compliance with industry custom is admissi-
ble on the issue of design defect. 30 Although Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 402 govern the admissibility of relevant evidence in federal courts
even in diversity cases, 31 the court examined Texas substantive law to de-
termine whether evidence of industry custom is relevant. 32 Noting that the
Texas Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the court made an Erie
guess that the Texas Supreme Court would hold that evidence of industry
custom is admissible. 33
The court reasoned that evidence need only be probative and that it
need not be dispositive to be relevant.34 Although the propriety of a man-
ufacturer's conduct is not at issue in a design defect case, industry custom
may indicate how an industry perceives the danger associated with the use
of a product. Moreover, while the Texas Supreme Court has rejected the
consumer expectation test in design defect cases in lieu of a risk-utility test,
evidence of the consumer's expectation is relevant to the risk-utility analy-
sis.35 Industry custom, in turn, is relevant to an ordinary consumer's expec-
tations. 36 The court recognized that industry custom differs from state-of-
the-art evidence,37 but its holding may render the distinction meaningless
since both types of evidence are now admissible. 38
28. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Strawbridge v. Cur-
tiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
29. 716 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff was injured when a motorized log-mov-
ing "skidder" backed into him. The skidder was not equipped with a back-up alarm.
30. 1d. at 348. The court did not address the issue of whether a product's nonconform-
ance with industry custom would be admissible, but it approvingly discussed Dean Keeton's
argument that evidence of industry custom should be admissible on the issue of a design
defect without distinguishing between conformance and nonconformance. Id. at 348-49 (cit-
ing Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 1, 11 (1981)).
31. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 93, at 620-27 (4th ed. 1983).
32. 716 F.2d at 347.
33. Id. at 348. Evidence of industry custom is admissible in Texas courts in negligence
cases. See South Austin Drive-In Theater v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 951 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
34. 716 F.2d at 348.
35. Id. at 348 (citing Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979)).
36. 716 F.2d at 348 (citing Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242,
1249 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981)).
37. 716 F.2d at 347-48 (citing Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748
(Tex. 1980)).
38. The Texas Supreme Court's distinction between state-of-the-art evidence and indus-
try custom in Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980), might
have been used to support a conclusion that, unlike state-of-the-art evidence, evidence of
industry custom is not admissible.
A distinction that might remain between state-of-the-art evidence and industry custom
evidence is that the former may actually define the standard of defectiveness whereas the
latter may merely be evidentiary. In Bailey the Texas Supreme Court held that state-of-the-
art evidence is merely evidentiary, not conclusive. 1d. at 748-49. The level of the state of the
art, however, was itself controverted in Bailey. Conceivably, notwithstanding Bailey, a stip-
[Vol. 38
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B. Standard of Defectiveness
Unforeseeable Risks. No single issue has caused more difficulty in strict
products liability cases than the role of foreseeability in defining defective-
ness.39 In Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.40 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas faced this issue again in a diversity
case governed by Texas law. The plaintiff claimed that defendant's asbes-
tos insulation products were both defectively designed and were defective
due to a failure to warn. The parties stipulated that the defendant neither
knew nor should have foreseen the risks attending the use of its products.41
Thus, the court was faced squarely with the role of foreseeability under
Texas law in defining both design defects and warning defects.
The court recognized that foreseeability has no role in Texas law in de-
termining whether a product has a design defect since design defects are
judged according to a product's risks as they are known at the time of
trial.42 Interpreting Texas law, however, the court held that a product is
defective due to a failure to warn only if the product dangers were foresee-
able to the manufacturer at the time the product was sold.43 This conclu-
sion was undoubtedly a correct Erie guess concerning the role of
foreseeability in Texas warning defect cases. Texas cases state that a prod-
uct is defective if a manufacturer fails to warn of risks that were reason-
ably foreseeable when the product was sold."4 The Committee on Texas
ulation that a product design is at state-of-the-art level would per se defeat liability. A
similar stipulation concerning industry custom presumably would not.
Despite holding that evidence of industry custom is admissible on the issue of design
defect, the Carter court held that the trial court's refusal to admit the evidence was harmless
error. 716 F.2d at 349. The court reasoned that industry custom normally has limited pro-
bative value and that defectiveness was not a central issue in the case. Judge Garwood,
concurring, noted that this case should not be interpreted as holding that "the erroneous
exclusion of evidence of a challenged design's conformance to industry custom in a Texas
law strict liability products action is normally harmless." Id. at 350.
39. See generaly Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30 (1973).
40. 557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
41. Id. at 1318.
42. Id. at 1319 (quoting from General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351
(Tex. 1977)):
[The manufacturer's] liability is not rested upon what he knew or should have
known when he manufactured or sold the product; it rests on his placing into
the stream of commerce a product which is demonstrated at trial to have been
dangerous. The damaging event may not have been reasonably foreseeable at
the time of manufacture or sale because the dangerous factor of the product
might not then have been even reasonably knowable. The supplier would
thus be free of culpability, but a price of his doing business is to protect people
from danger from his products-or to pay.
43. 557 F. Supp. at 1319.
44. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Crocker v.
Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v.
Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Olivarez v.
Broadway Hardware, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 557-58 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ); Flanery v. Terry Farris Stores, Inc., 438 S.W.2d
864, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ); Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co.,
437 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ret'd n.r.e.); see also Borel v.
1984]
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Pattern Jury Charges has stated that a plaintiff must prove that a product's
risks were foreseeable at the time it was sold in order to prevail in a warn-
ing defect case.45 Moreover, comment j to section 402A states that foresee-
ability is a factor in cases involving warning defects.46
Notwithstanding this authority, the role of foreseeability in warnings
cases is not free from doubt in Texas. The Texas Supreme Court has not
squarely held that warnings are judged only according to risks that were
known or foreseeable at the time of sale. In Crocker v. Winthrop Laborato-
ries47 the court upheld a finding of liability under section 402B 48 for an
affirmative misrepresentation. In dictum, the court declined to hold manu-
facturers responsible under section 402A for failure to warn of unforesee-
able risks, but it is unclear whether the court did so merely because it was
unnecessary to resolve the issue to decide the case. In Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Gonzales49 the court stated that a manufacturer is liable for failure to warn
of reasonably foreseeable risks. Since the product's risks in that case were
foreseeable, however, the court was not required to determine whether the
manufacturer would have escaped liability had the risks not been
foreseeable.50
Moreover, both Crocker and Gonzales involved drugs, which some juris-
dictions have suggested are special.5' The New Jersey courts have ex-
pressly distinguished between drugs and other products in determining
whether warning defects are to be judged according to risks known at the
time of trial or only according to risks that were reasonably foreseeable at
the time the product was sold.52 Texas courts could plausibly make this
same distinction. Nevertheless, the court in Carter made the appropriate
Erie guess concerning Texas law given the available precedents. 5 3
After dismissing the warning defects claim, the Carter court considered
the plaintiffs claim of a design defect. Under the Texas risk-utility test for
design defects, 54 the fact finder must compare a product's actual design
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
45. 3 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.05 (1982); see also Sales & Perdue, The
Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 20 (1976).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
47. 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
49. 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978).
50. None of the cases decided by the Texas Courts of Appeals has squarely held that a
product defendant escapes liability in a warning defect case if the risks associated with the
product were unforeseeable at the time the product was sold. See cases cited supra note 44.
51. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1983).
52. Compare Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982)
(asbestos manufacturer strictly liable for failure to warn of unforeseen risks); with Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983)
(distinguishing Beshada, drug manufacturer not strictly liable for failure to warn of unfore-
seen risks).
53. Carter itself constitutes a clear holding that foreseeability is an element of defective-
ness in warning defects cases since the failure to warn claim in Carter was actually dismissed
on this ground.
54. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979).
[Vol. 38
TORTS-PERSONAL
with feasible alternatives. 55 A feasible alternative in Carter was to sell
asbestos with an appropriate warning to reduce the risk of injury. The
defendant in Carter argued that since asbestos is not defective when ac-
companied by an appropriate warning, it is not defective without a warn-
ing that was itself not required under Texas law because the risks of
asbestos were unforeseeable at the time of sale. Since Texas law applies
hindsight rather than foresight to design defects,56 however, the court held
that the defendant could not escape liability for a design defect by arguing
that the risks that a warning reduces were unforeseeable when the product
was sold. 5
7
The court's reasoning would permit a plaintiff to convert any warning
defect into a design defect and thereby circumvent the Texas foreseeability
requirement for warning defects. If the lack of a warning makes a product
unreasonably dangerous under the risk-utility test, a comparison of the
actual design with the same design accompanied by a warning will neces-
sarily reveal a design defect under the risk-utility test. The same product
feature, the absence of a warning, renders the product defective, regardless
of whether a warning rubric or a design rubric is used. Permitting the
defendant to escape liability because the risks were unforeseeable when a
warning theory is used, but not when a design theory is used, seems
anomalous.
The problem has its source in the distinction between noninformational
features that make products safer and warnings that make them safer.
Manufacturers cannot be expected to warn against unknowable risks, but
neither can they be expected to account for unknowable risks during the
design process. The issue in Carter could be avoided by treating warning
defects and design defects similarly.58 Since Texas courts arguably distin-
guish between warning defects and design defects, 59 however, they must
determine whether the absence of a warning will be considered as a design
feature, notwithstanding the fact that the risks were not foreseeable when
the product was sold. If Texas courts follow the approach taken by the
court in Carter, plaintiffs should plead warning defects alternatively as de-
sign defects, claiming that an alternative design that includes a warning
would have been safer.
Jury Instructions. In Fleishman v. Guadiano60 the Texas Supreme Court
55. Id. at 846-47; Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 745-48 (Tex.
1980).
56. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
57. 557 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
58. Of course, this argument does not itself embrace or eschew foreseeability; it merely
suggests that foreseeability should play the same role in warning defect cases and design
defect cases. Some warnings do not make a product safer; they merely permit consumers to
exercise their autonomy. Even if warnings that make a product safer are treated like other
design features, autonomy warnings might nevertheless be adjudged by a negligence
standard.
59. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
60. 651 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1983).
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considered the appropriate jury instruction for a design defect. The plain-
tiff was injured when she slipped from a ladder, which she claimed had
been defectively designed. 61 The trial court instructed the jury on the defi-
nition of a design defect in accordance with Turner v. General Motors
Corp.62 The trial court, however, refused the plaintiffs request that the
jury also be instructed to ignore the plaintiffs contributory negligence in
determining whether the ladder was defective. The supreme court upheld
the trial court's refusal of the plaintiffs requested instruction.63
C Comparative Causation in Products Liability Suits
Adoption of Comparative Causation. In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co .64 the
Texas Supreme Court adopted comparative causation in strict products li-
ability cases. 65 First, the court held that a plaintiffs negligence is a defense
in a strict products liability action when the negligence is more than a mere
failure to discover a product defect.66 Second, while the Texas compara-
tive negligence statute 67 does not directly apply to a strict products liability
action, the court created a system of comparative causation to govern both
the reduction of a plaintiffs recovery and contribution among joint
tortfeasors in suits based on strict products liability.68
Although the court had previously recognized the absolute defense of
assumption of risk and the comparative defense of unforeseeable misuse in
strict products liability cases, it had declined to recognize contributory
negligence. 69 In Duncan the court recognized the procedural complexity of
this system in suits that involve both strict products liability and negli-
gence. 70 The court also noted that assumed risk and unforeseeable misuse
are merely extreme variations of contributory negligence in that all three
defenses focus, in varying degrees, on the reasonableness of a plaintiffs
conduct. 7' Consequently, the court recognized contributory negligence as
61. The suit was brought against the architect who designed the ladder, raising a poten-
tial problem concerning the applicability of strict tort liability to professional service provid-
ers. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968) (no strict liability for optometry
services). The court, however, did not address this issue.
62. 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979).
63. 651 S.W.2d at 731.
64. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984).
65. The court also addressed the effect of general releases. See infra text accompanying
notes 226-29.
66. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 224.
67. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
68. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 220-22.
69. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977)
(defense of unforeseeable misuse created in lieu of comparative negligence); Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975) (no defense that plaintiff did not inspect for open
and obvious defect); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Tex. 1974) (no
defense that plaintiff was negligent after discovering defect).
70. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 511-12; see Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-
1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 47-48 (1979).
71. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 218 (citing Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d




a defense that reduces recovery in strict products liability actions. 72 In so
doing, the court abolished assumption of risk and unforeseeable misuse as
absolute defenses in strict liability actions. 73
Nothing in the rationale underlying strict products liability is incompati-
ble with contributory negligence as a defense.7 4  The irrelevance of the
defendant's fault is not necessarily inconsistent with the plaintiffs fault
being an issue. Independent of our attitude toward manufacturers, we
may want to encourage consumers to be safe. Moreover, it may be unfair
to spread losses attributable to a plaintiff's fault among all the consumers
of a product. The historical reluctance of courts to recognize contributory
negligence as a defense in strict products liability actions has largely been
due to a dissatisfaction with the harsh, all-or-nothing consequences of the
defense. The advent of comparative principles has alleviated this problem.
The court also held that the reduction of a plaintiff's recovery and con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors are governed by comparative causation. 75
Although the Texas comparative negligence statute applies only to actions
for negligence, the court created a similar, but not identical, system of
comparative causation to govern strict products liability. This new system
governs the entirety of any action "in which at least one defendant is
found liable on a theory other than negligence."'76
The court's principal rationale for adopting comparative principles for
strict liability was to avoid the procedural labyrinth caused by imposing
divergent schemes on negligence and strict products liability actions,
which commonly occur in the same lawsuit.77 The court also reasoned
that an all-or-nothing approach to contribution is both unfair and ineffi-
cient because it fails to apportion accident costs relative to the parties' abil-
ities to have prevented those costs. 78 The court also relied on the fact that
a growing number of other courts have adopted comparative fault in strict
products liability actions. 79 The court's comparative scheme involves allo-
72. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 220-21.
73. Id. at 221. The court overruled General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977), and Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), to the extent that
they are inconsistent with Duncan. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 221.
74. See Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 798-
99 (1983).
75. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 220-22.
76. Id. at 222.
77. Id. at 218.
78. Id. at 218-19. The unfairness of an all or nothing approach is understandable. Its
inefficiency, however, is debatable. Efficiency depends on the incentives facing actors when
they engage in an activity. These incentives are governed by the aggregate likelihood of
liability, which may reflect proportionate ability to reduce accidents even if individual cases
are governed by an all or nothing or pro rata approach. A total rejection of contributory
negligence is theoretically inefficient because it removes the consumer's pecuniary interest in
safety, but contributory negligence as an all or nothing defense is not necessarily inefficient.
Fairness is a more powerful argument than allocative efficiency for comparative principles
in individual cases.
79. Id. at 219; see Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (admiralty juris-
diction); Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (Virgin Islands); Pan-
Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (admi-
ralty jurisdiction); Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft, 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981), aftd,
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cating a loss according to the parties' relative "causation" and is similar
but not identical to comparative negligence under article 2212a. 80 The
jury allocates a percentage of causation to the plaintiff, to the products
defendant and to other defendants, and the court structures an appropriate
judgment.81
Comparative causation creates problems for submitting a products lia-
bility case to the jury, since it combines two separate steps in allocating a
loss among defendants. Aside from comparative principles, a defendant is
appropriately held liable only for damages that it caused. Consider a
driver who is injured in a collision with another negligent motorist in
which (1) the original impact causes injuries to his back; (2) a defective
steering wheel shatters in his hand; and (3) a doctor treating him for the
injured hand negligently administers a drug that causes a rash. The negli-
gent driver is a cause-in-fact of all the plaintiffs injuries under the "but
for" test of causation. The steering wheel manufacturer, however, is a
cause-in-fact only of the hand injury and the rash, whereas the doctor is a
cause-in-fact only of the rash. The plaintiff, of course, is a cause-in-fact of
all three injuries.
Since the back injury was caused only by the negligent driver, he alone
(and the plaintiff if he was negligent) should be liable for it. Since the
hand injury was caused by both the negligent driver and the steering wheel
701 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1983); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Safeway
Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Hawaii 447, 654
P.2d 343 (1982); Sandford v. General Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Star Furni-
ture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.
2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
An obstacle to adopting comparative principles in strict products liability has been a fear
that comparing one party's fault with the culpability of a strict products liability defendant
who has not been at fault is theoretically impossible. Just as we often compare seemingly
incommensurate interests while making personal or social decisions, however, we can com-
pare the strength of our judgments that various actors bear a loss even if the judgments
concerning each actor are based on different underlying values. The court implicitly recog-
nized this by concluding that the jury can compare various versions of fault, including negli-
gence, selling a defective product, and breaching an implied or express warranty. The
court's holding may also suggest that strict products liability is not that different from negli-
gence. See Powers, supra note 74, at 802-05.
80. In its first opinion, which was subsequently replaced by a second opinion, the court
adopted comparative "fault." 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 515-16. The court's second opinion,
however, explicitly rejected comparative "fault" in favor of comparative "causation." 27
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 220.
81. The court suggested the following jury submission:
If, in answer to Questions -, -, and -, you have found that more than
one party's act(s) or product(s) contributed to cause the plaintiffs injuries, and
only in that event, then answer the following question.






27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 221.
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manufacturer, the hand injury should be allocated between them (and the
plaintiff when appropriate) according to the comparative allocation princi-
ples of Duncan. Since the rash was caused jointly by all three defendants,
it should be allocated among all three of them (and the plaintiff when ap-
propriate) according to the allocation principles of Duncan.
Using comparative causation to allocate the rash creates two problems.
First, if comparative causation means cause-in-fact, the rash cannot be al-
located, since each defendant (and the plaintiff) was a cause-in-fact of the
entire rash. 82 Second, if comparative causation refers to some other allo-
cative principle, using the word "causation" will confuse the jury, since the
allocation principle is different than the cause-in-fact principle that pro-
tects the doctor from liability for the back and hand injuries altogether. 83
By using the term "causation," the court creates the risk that these separate
allocative principles will be merged into one. 84
The court also considered four specific issues concerning the implemen-
tation of its comparative causation scheme. First, unlike comparative neg-
ligence under article 2212a, the scheme created in Duncan involves "pure,"
rather than "modified," comparative causation. Consequently, if the jury
assigns fifty-one percent causation to the plaintiff, his injury is reduced by
fifty-one percent rather than barred altogether. Second, each defendant is
jointly and severally liable even if he is less responsible than the plaintiff.
Under article 2212a, section 2(c), a negligent defendant is jointly and sev-
erally liable unless he is less negligent than the plaintiff, in which case he is
liable only for his own percentage of fault.85 Third, partial settlement be-
82. "Proximate causation" has its own difficulties as a method of allocation since a dif-
ferent standard governs proximate causation in negligence than governs producing cause in
strict products liability. See General Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 nn.3-4
(Tex. 1977).
83. For the jury to accurately allocate damages, it must first decide who caused which
portions of the injury. For example, the driver alone caused the back injury; the driver and
the steering wheel manufacturer caused the hand injury; and the driver, steering wheel man-
ufacturer, and doctor caused the rash. Then the jury must allocate percentages within each
category. This should not be done in one submission, because the jury may want to allocate
a high percentage of the rash to the doctor, but a high percentage of the hand injury to the
steering wheel manufacturer.
84. Faith that the jury will separate these tasks in a single submission is naive. If dam-
ages due to the rash are $1000, damages due to the hand are $5000, and damages due to the
back are $25,000, a single submission could easily lead the jury to allocate 10% to the doctor,
30% to the steering wheel manufacturer, and 60% to the negligent driver. The resulting
judgment of $3100 against the doctor would not be supported by the evidence unless the
court was willing to abandon the principle that defendants are liable only for damages they
have in fact caused. Cases in which a jury cannot determine which defendant caused which
portions of the harm present a different and more complicated issue. See, e.g., Loui v.
Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968) (plaintiff injured same area of body in four
separate automobile accidents over four years); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 23 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (plaintiffs could not trace cancer-causing drug, which was pre-
scribed by doctors generically rather than by brand name, to any one of several manufactur-
ers who had mutually agreed to use the same drug formula), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
85. Thus, an insolvent tortfeasor's share of the loss is allocated to the other defendants,
regardless of the relative percentages allotted to the plaintiff and the other defendants. 27
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 222 & n.9.
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tween the plaintiff and one defendant reduces the plaintiff's claim against
the other defendants by the percentage loss allocated by the jury to the
settling defendant. If the plaintiff makes an advantageous settlement, the
plaintiff may recover more than the entire amount of the damages,
notwithstanding the one-recovery rule of Bradshaw v. Baylor University.86
Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs negligent failure to discover or
guard against a product defect is not a defense.
Each of these features conflicts with the treatment of a negligence case
under article 2212a. Since the court's principal rationale in Duncan was
the procedural nightmare of using conflicting schemes in different parts of
the same lawsuit, the court understandably concluded that its judicially
created scheme applies to all aspects of a lawsuit in which at least one
defendant is held strictly liable.8 7 Consequently, negligent defendants are
no longer afforded the protection of article 2212a in cases in which a prod-
uct manufacturer is also held liable on a theory other than negligence.
The court's rationale for not applying article 2212a to strict products
liability claims is dubious. The court reasoned that article 2212a was in-
tended to exclude products liability claims, since it "refers only to negli-
gence actions, even though strict products liability had been judicially
adopted six years earlier." s88 Article 2212 does not control products liabil-
ity actions, the court reasoned, because it "was enacted in 1917, long
before any identifiable body of strict products liability law existed." '89 It
does seem clear, however, that when the legislature enacted article 2212a,
when it did understand the nature of strict products liability, it did not
envision three different schemes.
Given the ambiguity regarding the legislature's intent to include strict
products liability in article 2212a, the procedural nightmare of having sep-
arate schemes govern different aspects of the same lawsuit could justify the
court's interpretation of article 2212a to include strict products liability.
But article 2212a at least represents a legislative judgment that if compara-
tive principles are used, they should be used in the method described by
the statute. This is especially true for the negligence actions that the court
now holds are no longer governed by article 2212a simply because they are
coupled with products liability claims. It is desirable to have one scheme
govern all aspects of a single lawsuit. The court may be convinced that
certain features of article 2212a are undesirable, but they should at least be
followed in negligence actions. If uniformity is desirable, uniform applica-
86. 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935, opinion adopted); see infra
text accompanying notes 91-104.
87. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 222. Since a finding of strict liability is unknown until after
the verdict, presumably Duncan will control the submission of any action in which an issue
of one defendant's strict liability is submitted to the jury. The court held, however, that the
judgment would be controlled by art. 2212a if the jury refused to hold at least one defendant
strictly liable. Id. This may create difficulties, however, since the submission will have
asked the jury to compare causation, whereas art. 2212a requires a comparison of fault.




tion of article 2212a would be more harmonious with the legislative
mandate.
The court's distinction between its scheme and article 2212a leaves nu-
merous problems unresolved. For example, will the court follow the set-
off provisions of article 2212a, section 2(f), or will it treat cases involving
immune worker's compensation employers similar to their treatment
under article 2212a?90 The implication of Duncan is that the court is writ-
ing on a clean slate.
Settling Tortfeasors. In Thibodeaux v. Fibreboard Corp.9' the Fifth Circuit
considered the treatment of settling tortfeasors in strict products liability
actions. The plaintiff had settled with thirteen of fourteen joint tortfeasors
who were all manufacturers of asbestos products. He then sued the four-
teenth manufacturer for strict products liability, and the jury found that
the plaintiffs damages were less than the total settlements. 92 The defend-
ant argued that under the Bradshaw one-recovery rule, the plaintiff should
recover nothing because he had already received full compensation for his
injury.93 The plaintiff argued that he should recover one-fourteenth of the
jury's award by applying Palestine Contractors, which provides for propor-
tionate reduction of a plaintiffs award against remaining, nonsettling joint
tortfeasors. 94
Thibodeaux was decided before the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,95 so the Fifth Circuit assumed that article
221296 and Palestine Contractors, rather than comparative causation, gov-
erned an action for strict products liability. The court held that the Brad-
shaw one-recovery rule controlled, rather than the proportionate reduction
rule of Palestine Contractors and, consequently, that the defendant was
entitled to a take nothing judgment.97 The court reasoned that whenever
Texas courts had considered a conflict between Bradshaw and another line
of cases, they had inevitably followed Bradshaw. The court, therefore,
made an Erie guess that Texas courts would follow Bradshaw rather than
Palestine Contractors when the two approaches conflicted.
The court's reasoning overlooks Cypress Creek Utility Service Co. v.
Muller,9" which held that a jury finding of a settling tortfeasor's percentage
of negligence requires proportionate reduction under article 2212a, section
2(e), which takes precedence over the Bradshaw one-recovery rule. 99
90. See Varela v. American Petrofina Co., 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983); infra text ac-
companying notes 148-61.
91. 706 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 729.
93. See Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1935, opinion adopted).
94. See Palestine Contractors v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
95. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984).
96. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); see General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
97. 706 F.2d at 730-3 1.
98. 640 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982).
99. Id. at 867. The Thibodeaux court merely cited Cypress Creek with a "but cf." sig-
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Cypress Creek relied heavily on the legislative intent of article 2212a,
which was not directly implicated in Thibodeaux. Moreover, the unfair-
ness of permitting a defendant to choose proportionate reduction and then
escape its consequences was not present in Thibodeaux, as it was in Cypress
Creek. 100 Nevertheless, Cypress Creek at least suggests that the Bradshaw
one-recovery rule is not inviolate.
The conflict between Bradshaw and Palestine Contractors will not be an
issue after the effective date of Duncan,10' since strict products liability will
be governed by comparative causation rather than by article 2212 and Pal-
estine Contractors.10 2 The supreme court in Duncan held that a plaintiffs
recovery against remaining defendants is reduced by the percentage allo-
cated to a settling defendant, not by the dollar amount of the settlement. 103
Accordingly, Duncan explicitly overruled the Bradshaw one-recovery rule
in products liability actions, "I4 just as Cypress Creek overruled it in negli-
gence actions governed by article 2212a, section 2(e).
Comparative Fault in Admiralty. Although federal courts have long used
comparative negligence in admiralty cases based on negligence, 10 5 the use
of comparative fault in suits by longshoremen based on strict products lia-
bility has been more problematical. In Lewis v. Timco, Inc. 10 6 a Fifth Cir-
cuit panel considering a longshoreman's claim declined to follow other
circuit courts that have applied comparative fault to strict products liabil-
ity claims. 10 7 Consequently, the defendant was not permitted to reduce the
longshoreman's recovery by proving contributory negligence. The court
granted a rehearing, however, and reversed the ruling of the panel. 108
Noting the trend to adopt comparative fault in strict products liability
cases, the court held that comparative fault is applicable to strict products
liability claims by longshoremen in admiralty cases. 0 9
nal. 706 F.2d at 730. It did not explain why Cypress Creek did not mandate a contrary
result.
100. 706 F.2d at 729. Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); with
id. art. 2212a, § 2(d), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1984). See Cypress Creek Util. Serv. Co. v. Muller,
640 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Tex. 1982). Of course, unfairness is not a factor when the plaintiff in a
negligence action has selected proportionate reduction under art. 2212a, § 2(e) by requesting
the appropriate jury issues. See Cypress Creek, 640 S.W.2d at 866.
101. Duncan applies to all cases tried after July 13, 1983. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 226.
102. See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
103. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 224.
104. Id.
105. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 500 n.70 (2d ed. 1975).
106. 697 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. See cases cited supra note 79.
108. 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
109. Id. at 1431; see cases cited supra note 79. This result is justifiable on the basis of
fairly allocating a loss among the various parties. It also follows the trend in state and
federal courts toward adopting comparative fault in strict products liability actions. The
court reasoned that recognizing comparative negligence as a defense will help optimize in-
vestments in safety by both parties. 716 F.2d at 1432-33. The court argued that the rejection
of comparative negligence results in an overcharge to the defendant and thereby creates an
undue incentive for an inefficient increase in the defendant's expenditures for safety. Id. at
1032. This argument is incorrect. Defendants will tend to stop investing in safety at the




In Fitzgerald Marine Sales v. LeUnes 0 the Fort Worth court of appeals
considered a difficult problem concerning the treatment of unusual results
caused by allegedly defective products. The plaintiff was injured when he
was thrown from a motorboat. The steering wheel that he was holding
broke as he left the boat, and he alleged that the steering wheel was defec-
tive because of voids in the plastic. The court characterized the alleged
defect as a manufacturing flaw and held that the defendants were not lia-
ble even if the steering wheel was flawed.' I I The court reasoned that strict
liability does not arise simply upon a showing of a defect in the product;
the plaintiff must also show that the product is rendered unreasonably
dangerous as a result of the defect.' 12 This conclusion overlooks the fact
that even under the risk-utility test, a flawed product is almost always un-
reasonably dangerous because flaws do not have any apparent utility.' '3
The main thrust of the court's reasoning, however, was that the plaintiff
introduced no evidence showing that the steering wheel was defective for
its intended purpose of steering the boat. 1 4 This reasoning raises a
number of difficult issues. First, the court may have been implicitly rely-
ing on the doctrine of misuse, but the test of misuse is foreseeability of use,
not the manufacturer's intent. Moreover, misuse does not bar a plaintiffs
recovery entirely, it merely reduces recovery. 15
Second, the court may have been relying on the fact that unusual acci-
dents are so unlikely that they contribute very little to the risk side of the
risk-utility test of defectiveness. This interpretation of Fitzgerald comports
with the court's conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover at
all, rather than that the plaintiff's recovery should merely be reduced, since
the steering wheel was held to be not defective as a matter of law." 16 This
view, however, relies on the questionable premises that manufacturing de-
fects are governed by the risk-utility test and that the utility of the flaw
outweighs even the slightest risk of this type of unusual accident.
Another rationale for denying rather than merely reducing recovery
might be that even if the steering wheel was flawed, the flaw was not a
producing cause of the injury. Unusual results in negligence are analyzed
under the rubric of proximate causation, and using producing cause to ac-
complish this task in products liability would be sensible. General Motors
tory negligence. Rejecting contributory negligence is theoretically inefficient because it gives
the plaintiff a free ride, thereby reducing his economic incentive for safety.
110. 659 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
111. Id. at 918-19.
112. Id. at 918.
113. See generally Powers, supra note 74, at 784-94. The court also alluded to the con-
sumer expectation test, 659 S.W.2d at 919, which seems to be inconsistent with the holding
of Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979). But see 3 TEXAS
PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.01, at 211 (1982).
114. 659 S.W.2d at 919.
115. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213, 221 (Feb. 15, 1984).
116. 659 S.W.2d at 919.
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Corp. v. Hopkins" 7 precludes using foreseeability as the test of producing
cause in strict products liability, but it need not preclude the use of other
policies concerning the scope of liability. 1 8 The scope of this survey does
not extend to suggesting a comprehensive test. Fitzgerald may be signifi-
cant because it raises a difficult issue concerning the appropriate treatment
of unusual results caused by allegedly defective products. This issue lies at
the intersection of defectiveness, misuse and producing cause, and will re-
quire careful attention.
E Special Transactions
In G- W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux 19 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
implied warranty of habitability created in Humber v. Morton 120 for the
sale of a new house can be waived as long as the waiver is clear and free
from doubt.' 2' The waiver need not comply with the waiver provisions of
section 2.316 of the Commercial Code 122 since article 2 does not apply to
real estate transactions. 23 The court also reasoned that building contracts
are hybrid transactions involving both services and materials, and that
such transactions are governed by article 2 only if their essence is the sale
of materials. Since the building contract in Robichaux was essentially a
service, article 2 did not apply.' 24
The court's reasoning concerning the product-service distinction clouds
the question of the applicability of strict tort liability to hybrid product-
service transactions. Robichaux did not involve an action for strict prod-
ucts liability because strict products liability does not apply to real estate
transactions, and because the plaintiff did not suffer personal injury or
property damage other than to the house itself.' 25 Nevertheless, the court's
treatment of the product-service distinction in the context of article 2 may
affect its treatment of the same distinction in strict products liability
actions.
The "essence of the transaction" test is inconsistent with the court's ear-
117. 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 n.3 (Tex. 1977).
118. See Powers supra note 74, at 805-09.
119. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
120. 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968).
121. 643 S.W.2d at 393.
122. The supreme court reserved this issue in Watel v. Richman, 576 S.W.2d 779, 780
(Tex, 1978). The court disapproved of the holding in MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d
916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), that the provisions of § 2.316 are
applicable to waivers of the implied warranty of habitability in real estate transactions. 643
S.W.2d at 394. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Vernon 1968) (Tex. UCC):
"Subject to Subsection (c), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or
any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous ....
123. 643 S.W.2d at 394; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.102, .105 (Vernon 1968)
(Tex, UCC). Even though art. 2 is not applicable to real estate transactions, the court might
have borrowed from its provisions to control waivers of the court-created implied warranty
of habitability.
124. 643 S.W.2d at 394.
125. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp.
v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312-13 (Tex. 1978).
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lier treatment of the product-service distinction in strict products liability
cases. In Barbee v. Rogers 126 the court held that an optometrist's failure to
fit a contact lens properly was not governed by strict products liability.
The court relied in part on the fact that the miscarriage was due to the
service component of the hybrid transaction, suggesting that some parts of
a product-service transaction may be governed by strict products liability
while others are not. 27 This reasoning runs counter to the essence of the
transaction test, which entails that an entire transaction be within or
outside the scope of strict products liability.
The court in Robichaux did not cite Barbee or a long line of appellate
cases dealing with the product-service distinction. 28 The court probably
did not intend to upset this line of cases with its brief reference to the
essence of the transaction test in Robichaux, especially in the context of
article 2. Nevertheless, Robichaux may be a harbinger of the general ap-
plication of the essence of the transaction test in cases involving the prod-
uct-service distinction.' 29
II. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The Texas Supreme Court decided three cases involving comparative
negligence under article 2212a.' 30 These cases may also be applicable in
strict products liability actions if the courts borrow from article 2212a to
define the new comparative causation scheme adopted in Duncan.' 31
A. Settling Tortfeasors
The treatment of settling tortfeasors under article 2212a has presented
recurring problems. 32 The Texas Supreme Court again faced the issue in
an unusual situation in Dabney v. Home Insurance Co. 133 During a two-car
automobile race on a public highway, car 1 (insured by Home Insurance)
126. 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968).
127. Id.
128. See Navarro County Elec. Coop. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App.-Waco
1982, no writ); Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 131-33 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd); Langford v. Kraft, 551 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1977), afl'd, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d
583, 588-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston lst Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); Erwin v. Guadalupe
Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 355-56 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonion 1974, writ refd
n.r.e.); Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. For a more detailed analysis of the product-service distinction in products liability,
see Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV.
415 (1984).
130. Varela v. American Petrofina Co., 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983); Arthur Bros., Inc. v.
U.M.C., 647 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1982); Dabney v. Home Ins. Co., 643 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1982);
see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
131. See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Cypress Creek Util. Serv. Co. v. Muller, 640 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982);
Clemtex Ltd. v. Dube, 578 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ refd n.r.e.);
Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
133. 643 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1982).
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went out of control, injuring its driver (who was not the owner) and pas-
sengers. The driver of car 2 was uninsured. Home Insurance settled with
the passengers under the liability provision of the policy and settled with
both the driver of car 1 and the passengers under the personal injury pro-
tection (PIP) provision of the policy. The driver of car 1 and the passen-
gers then sued Home Insurance for the negligence of the driver of car 2
under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy. The jury found that






The supreme court held that for the purpose of determining whether an
individual plaintiff can recover under the Texas modified comparative
negligence statute, the driver's negligence is not imputed to the passen-
gers.' 3 5 It also held that payments made by Home Insurance under the
PIP provision of the policy did not constitute set-off against its liability
under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy. 136 Moreover, the
court held that payments made by Home Insurance under the liability pro-
visions of the policy did not effect a dollar-for-dollar reduction of recovery
under the uninsured motorist provision. 137 Instead, since the negligence of
each tortfeasor was submitted to the jury, Home Insurance was entitled to
proportional reduction based on the percentage of negligence found
against each party.' 38
In the context of the suit against Home Insurance as representative of
the uninsured driver of car 2, the driver of car 1 was merely a settling
tortfeasor. Consequently, under article 2212a, section 2(e), the recovery
against the driver of car 2 (and, therefore, Home Insurance under the un-
insured motorist provision) should be reduced by the percentage of negli-
gence attributed to driver 1, as long as the negligence of driver 1 was
134. Id. at 387.
135. Id. at 389; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1984)
(barring recovery by a plaintiff who is more than 50% negligent).
136. 643 S.W.2d at 389; see Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.
1974). In Tucker the court relied on the fact that a set-off for PIP payments against unin-
sured motorist payments would have reduced the uninsured motorist payments below the
statutory minimum. Id. at 685-86; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981).
The court in Dabney did not rely on this rationale and simply stated that in Tucker "we held
an insurer was not entitled to set off payments under medical payments coverage against
claims made under uninsured motorist coverage." 643 S.W.2d at 389.
The result in Dabney may merely be an application of the collateral source rule. Since the
uninsured driver would not have been able to reduce his liability by payments made under
the victim's insurance policy, arguably neither should the insurer standing in the shoes of the
uninsured motorist. Less clear, however, is whether the insurer could recoup its PIP pay-
ments through a subrogation clause for any proceeds the plaintiff receives from a tortfeasor,
including proceeds from the insurer standing in the place of the tortfeasor under the unin-
sured motorist provision of the policy.
137. 643 S.W.2d at 389.
138. Id. (citing Cypress Creek Util. Serv. Co. v. Muller, 64.0 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982)).
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submitted to the jury.' 39 The passengers' recovery should also be reduced
by their own negligence under article 2212a, section 1. This, in fact, ap-
pears to be the method used by the trial court to calculate the damages.' 40
Consequently, Dabney represents a straightforward application of article
2212a and Cypress Creek, albeit in a somewhat complex setting.'
4
'
B. Venue for Contribution
In Arthur Brothers, Inc. v. U.M C, Inc.142 the Texas Supreme Court
held that article 2212a, section 2(g), which provides that "[aIll claims for
contribution between named defendants in the primary suit shall be deter-
mined in the primary suit,"' 43 applies to third-party defendants whom the
original defendants sued for contribution. 144 Consequently, sustaining a
plea of privilege by the third-party defendant to be sued in its home county
was improper. If venue is proper for the primary suit, venue is also proper
for the third-party action.145
The new Texas venue statute perpetuates the holding in Arthur Brothers.
In addition to eliminating the plea of privilege as a mechanism for chal-
lenging venue, the new statute explicitly provides that venue over third-
party claims is proper if venue over the principal claim is appropriate.'
46
Consequently, in suits arising after the effective date of the new venue stat-
ute, the result in Arthur Brothers will occur independently of the language
of article 2212a, section 2(g).' 47
C. Negligence of a Workers' Compensation Employer
In Varela v. American Petrofina Co. 148 the plaintiff was injured at work,
allegedly as a result of his employer's negligence and the negligence of a
third party. After collecting from his employer's workers' compensation
insurer, the plaintiff sued the third party for negligence. The trial court
139. If the negligence of driver I had not been submitted to the jury, the recovery against
driver 2 should have been reduced by the dollar amount of the settlements under art. 2212a,
§ 2(d).
140. 643 S.W.2d at 389-90.
141. The court also held that a passenger's knowledge that the driver was intoxicated
coupled with a reasonable opportunity to leave does not constitute an absolute bar to recov-
ery, but is merely a factor under comparative negligence. Id. at 388-89.
142. 647 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1982).
143. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
144. 647 S.W.2d at 245-46.
145. In so holding, the supreme court resolved a conflict among the courts of appeals, by
agreeing with State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Hardy, 607 S.W.2d 611, 614-15
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd), and Gonzales v. Blake, 605 S.W.2d 634, 637
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, no writ), and disagreeing with Blair v. Thomas,
604 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ), and Maintenance & Equip.
Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, writ dism'd). Since the supreme court agreed with the court of appeals in Arthur Bros.,
it refused the application for writ of error. 647 S.W.2d at 246.
146. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2124 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1983)).
147. The act became effective on Sept. 1, 1983. 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2125.
148. 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983).
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submitted jury issues concerning the negligence of the plaintiff, the em-
ployer and the third party. The jury found that the plaintiff was fifteen
percent negligent, the employer was forty-two percent negligent, and the
third party was forty-three percent negligent. 149 The trial court then re-
duced the plaintiffs recovery by both his own negligence and the negli-
gence of his employer, and the court of appeals affirmed.150 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs recovery against the
negligent third party should not be reduced by the employer's percentage
of negligence. ' 51
The court's reasoning was puzzling. Under the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Act, an injured worker cannot recover from his employer in an
action for negligence, and a third-party tortfeasor who is liable to the
worker cannot recover contribution from the employer. 52 The court held
that these provisions of the Act are exceptions to article 2212a, section 2(b),
which provides that contribution to the damage award is proportional to
the amount of negligence attributable to each party.153 This construction is
reasonable since article 2212a, section 2(b), addresses the method of calcu-
lating contribution when it is available; it does not create a right of contri-
bution when the Workers' Compensation statute expressly precludes one.
The negligent defendant in Varela, however, was not attempting to ob-
tain contribution from the employer. The issue was whether the plaintiff
or the negligent defendant should bear the portion of negligence attributa-
ble to the employer. The defendant's theory was that the employer, who
was immune under the Workers' Compensation Act, was similar to a set-
tling joint tortfeasor. The employer's percentage of negligence, therefore,
should proportionately reduce the plaintiff's recovery under article 2212a,
section 2(e). 154
The court rejected this argument. First, it stated that since the plaintiff
had no cause of action against his employer, the defendant had no claim
for contribution from the employer, which, in turn, rendered article 2212a,
section 2(e), inapplicable. 55 This reasoning overlooks the fact that a non-
settling tortfeasor does not have a claim of contribution against a normal
149. Id. at 561.
150. 644 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983).
151. 658 S.W.2d at 562. The supreme court also decided a companion case on the same
point. Teakell v. Perma Stone Co., 658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1983). The trial court in Teakell
had refused to consider the employer's negligence, but the court of appeals reversed. 653
S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi). The supreme court reversed the court of appeals
on the basis of Varela. 658 S.W.2d at 563.
152. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
153. The court also reasoned that since the plaintiff has no common law right to recover
for the employer's negligence, the other negligent defendant has no right of contribution
against the employer. 658 S.W.2d at 562. This reasoning is superfluous since the Workers'
Compensation Act explicitly provides that other defendants have no right of contribution
against the employer. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
154. If the percentage negligence of the employer was not submitted to the jury, the
defendant's theory would, presumably, entail a reduction of the plaintiffs recovery accord-
ing to art. 2212a, § 2(d).
155. 658 S.W.2d at 562
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settling tortfeasor, and yet section 2(e) clearly applies to such a case. The
mere absence of a right of contribution does not preclude the application
of section 2(e).
Second, the court concluded that the payment by the employer's insurer
under the Workers' Compensation Act was not a settlement; therefore, sec-
tion 2(e), and presumably section 2(d), did not apply.156 While a payment
under the Workers' Compensation Act is not precisely a settlement, this
conclusion does not resolve the issue. The problem is that two situations in
which a plaintiff cannot recover from a negligent party are explicitly cov-
ered by article 2212a. Section 2(c) provides that the percentage of dam-
ages attributable to an insolvent defendant is borne by other defendants
who are not less negligent than the plaintiff. Section 2(e) places a settling
defendant's percentage of negligence on the plaintiff by reducing the plain-
tifl's recovery. Since article 2212a does not expressly deal with immune
defendants, the court should have adopted the treatment that accords with
the scheme the statute has established. A conclusion that section 2(e) does
not precisely apply does not resolve the issue, because no provision of arti-
cle 2212a applies precisely.
The court should have examined the purposes of article 2212a as shown
by the treatment of insolvent and settling defendants, and thus resolved
the problem of immune defendants in a way that reflects the purposes of
the statute. This requires a determination of whether immune defendants
are similar to settling defendants or insolvent defendants, given the statu-
tory purpose for distinguishing between insolvent defendants and settling
tortfeasors. Settling defendants differ from insolvent defendants because
the plaintiff is benefited by the former, but is neither benefited by nor re-
sponsible for the latter. Consequently, a conclusion that the plaintiff
should bear the percentage of negligence for settling defendants is reason-
able. The problem of insolvent defendants, however, cannot be as easily
resolved. Article 2212a, section 2(c) is a reasonable solution since it puts
the percentage of negligence of an insolvent defendant on either the plain-
tiff or the solvent defendant, depending on which of them is more
culpable. 15 7
Given these purposes, a workers' compensation employer is more akin
to a settling defendant than to an insolvent defendant. Immune employers
differ from settling tortfeasors because the plaintiff normally can choose
whether to settle, whereas a plaintiff cannot choose whether to settle with
his employer under the Workers' Compensation Act.' 58 Nevertheless, like
a settlement, a workers' compensation award benefits the plaintiff, and the
other defendant is neither responsible for nor benefitted by it. Unlike a
defendant's insolvency, an employer's immunity is granted only in ex-
156. Id. at 562-63.
157. In cases in which the plaintiff and the solvent defendant are equally negligent, § 2(c)
places the percentage negligence of the insolvent tortfeasor on the solvent defendant.
158. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
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change for a benefit to the plaintiff. 5 9
Even if immune employers are more analogous to insolvent tortfeasors
than to settling tortfeasors, a remaining defendant should be treated at
least as advantageously as in cases involving an insolvent defendant.
Under section 2(c) a defendant is liable only for its own percentage of
negligence if it is less negligent than the plaintiff, regardless of the insol-
vency of another defendant. Varela does not necessarily rule out this pos-
sibility, since the remaining defendant was more negligent than the
plaintiff, but the court's opinion does not suggest that immune employers
will be treated like insolvent defendants under section 2(c). Moreover, in
the companion case of Teakell v. Perma Stone Co.160 the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to submit the employer's negligence
to the jury. The result in Teakell is inconsistent with treating an employer
like an insolvent defendant.
A final problem with Varela is that if the employer's negligence should
not be submitted to the jury, as Teakell holds, Varela should have been
remanded for a new trial, since the court did submit the employer's negli-
gence to the jury. If the employer's negligence had not been submitted to
the jury, the jury could have found higher percentages of negligence for
both the plaintiff and the defendant. Since the defendant was liable for all
the damages not attributable to the plaintiff, raising the plaintiffs percent-
age of negligence would reduce the defendant's liability. Thus, in Varela
the defendant was probably held liable for a higher percentage of the dam-
ages than it would have been had the employer's negligence not been sub-
mitted to the jury. Although the defendant requested that the employer's
negligence be submitted to the jury, this request was for the purpose of
reducing the plaintiffs award under article 2212a, section 2(e). The court's
decision to place the employer's percentage of negligence, as found by the
jury, on the defendant gave the plaintiff a higher percentage recovery than
either the section 2(e) method or the Teakell position would entail.
The legislature did not consider the treatment of an immune employer's
negligence when it enacted article 2212a. Similar issues may arise con-
cerning other forms of immunity. The court should resolve these issues in
harmony with the situations that article 2212a does address. The opinion
in Varela fails to do this. It merely concludes that since article 2212a does
not expressly address the situation, the plaintifIs position should pre-
vail.161 Perhaps the legislature should expressly provide for the treatment
of immune tortfeasors under article 2212a.
159. This analysis does not apply to all immunities. Governmental immunity, for exam-
ple, does not create a specific benefit for the plaintiff in exchange for the immunity. Conse-
quently, each type of immunity should be analyzed on its own merits.
160. 658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1983).




A. Statute of Limitations
In 1975 the Texas Legislature enacted a special two-year statute of limi-
tations in medical malpractice actions against health care providers carry-
ing professional liability insurance.' 62 This two-year limitation applied to
all persons regardless of legal disability except minors under the age of six
years. 163 Consequently, a minor could be time barred in a medical mal-
practice action after reaching the age of eight years. In 1977 the legislature
enacted the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act,'164 which
included minors under the age of twelve years within the exception, giving
minors at least until their fourteenth birthday to file an action.16 5 Prior to
the enactment of these statutes, the statute of limitations for medical mal-
practice claims was tolled under general Texas law for all tort actions until
two years after a minor reached the age of majority.' 66
In Sax v. Votteler 167 the Texas Supreme Court held that the provision in
the 1975 Act permitting a malpractice action to be barred after the plain-
tiffs eighth birthday violates the open courts provision of the Texas Con-
stitution. 168 Relying on Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 169 the court held that
a statute that unreasonably abridges a right to obtain redress for personal
injuries is void as a denial of due process under the open courts provi-
sion.' 70 The court went on to hold that "the right to bring a well-estab-
lished common law cause of action cannot be effectively abrogated by the
legislature absent a showing that the legislative basis for the statute out-
weighs the denial of the constitutionally-guaranteed right of redress."' 17'
To demonstrate that a statute violates the open courts provision, a liti-
gant must show that he has a cognizable common law cause of action and
that the restriction on that cause of action is unreasonable when weighed
against the purpose of the statute. 172 The court recognized that the general
purpose of the Act was to establish insurance rate standards that would
162. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865-66 (codified at TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4), repealed by Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064.
163. Id.
164. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2039 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
165. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Article 4590i,
§ 1.03 does not distinguish between insured and uninsured health care providers, in contrast
to the 1975 Act's applicability only to insured health care providers.
166. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5526, 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
167. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
168. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law." The medical treatment in Sax occurred in 1976, before the effective date of the
1977 Act.
169. 121 Tex. 202, 210, 48 S.W.2d 944, 947 (1932). The court also relied on Lebohm v.
City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 197, 275 S.W.2d 951, 954 (1955), and Waites v. Sondock,
561 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1977).
170. 648 S.W.2d at 665.
171. Id. at 665-66.
172. Id. at 666.
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allow health care providers to obtain liability insurance. The court further
recognized that the specific purpose of the limitation provision was to limit
the insurer's period of potential liability. Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that barring a child's malpractice claim is arbitrary and unreasona-
ble when weighed against this purpose. Relying upon parents, who might
be unaware of the claim, negligent, or even minors themselves, to file a
timely medical malpractice lawsuit would be unreasonable and unrealis-
tic.' 73 Given the other interests of children we entrust to parents, the
court's holding regarding the unreasonableness of entrusting parents with
the responsibility of bringing a lawsuit is odd. The court's holding on this
point, however, is clear. 174
The impact of Sax on the current medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions imposed by the 1977 Act is slightly ambiguous. The 1977 Act im-
poses a two-year limitation period to all persons except minors under the
age of twelve years, rather than excepting only minors under the age of six
years as provided by the 1975 Act. 175 The court did not expressly conclude
that this revised limitation period also violates the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution, but the court's reasoning is arguably as applicable
to the new Act as to its predecessor. True, the new statute may not be as
unreasonable, since it entrusts the claims of children to their parents for a
shorter period of minority, but during this period the children, though
older, are just as incapable of litigating on their own behalf.
B. Sixty-Day Notice Under the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act
Section 4.01 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
requires that a claimant give written notice of his medical malpractice
claim to the health care provider at least sixty days before filing a lawsuit
on that claim. 176 In Schepps v. Presbyterian Hospital 177 the plaintiff filed a
lawsuit without giving the required sixty-day notice. After the statute of
limitations had run, the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the notice provision had not been
met. 178 The Texas Supreme Court held that the notice provision of section
4.01 was mandatory rather than merely directory, but that dismissal was
not the appropriate remedy. 179 Rather, a district court should merely
abate the action for sixty days to permit the parties to negotiate a settle-
ment.' 80 The court reasoned that the purpose of the sixty-day notice re-
173. Id. at 666-67.
174. The court also held that the parents' causes of action were barred, since the parents
failed to file their claims within the statutory time period. Id. at 667. Parents may recover
medical costs and lost earning capacity of a minor child prior to the child's eighteenth birth-
day. Id.
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
176. Id. art. 4590i, § 4.01.
177. 652 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1983).
178. Id. at 935.
179. Id. at 938.
180. In Wilborn v. University Hosp., 642 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no
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quirement is to encourage pre-litigation negotiations and that this can be
accomplished by requiring an abatement of the action for sixty days.' 8'
Chief Justice Pope noted in his dissent, however, that a sixty-day abate-
ment is not equivalent to pre-litigation notice.' 82 Professional embarrass-
ment caused by a lawsuit may rigidify the parties and make settlement less
likely, even during a sixty-day abatement period. Nevertheless, the stat-
ute's purpose is not wholly frustrated by the majority's position, despite the
chief justice's assertion to the contrary, 83 since at least the burden of dis-
covery can be delayed during a sixty-day abatement while settlement ne-
gotiations take place. Consequently, the majority's reading of the statute is
at last plausible, if not compelling. Moreover, the harsh remedy of dismis-
sal for a procedural error should be reserved for situations in which the
legislature has spoken clearly, or where dismissal is essential to effectuate a
procedural scheme. Since one purpose of the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act was to stabilize malpractice insurance rate struc-
tures, substantial compliance with the Act's requirements may be enough,
and a sixty-day abatement may sufficiently encourage substantial compli-
ance. Although this conclusion is arguably empirically incorrect, it at least
suggests that the majority's interpretation may not eviscerate the sixty-day
notice requirement.
C Expert Testimony Concerning Disclosure of Risks
In medical malpractice cases, Texas common law requires a plaintiff to
introduce expert medical testimony to prove what a reasonable doctor of
the same school and of the same or similar community would have done
under similar circumstances. 84 Consequently, unlike other industries, 85
doctors collectively set the standards against which their conduct is judged.
Unlike some jurisdictions, 86 Texas courts have not recognized an excep-
tion to the requirement of a medical standard for cases involving warnings
and disclosure of risks.' 87 In Peterson v. Shields' 88 the Texas Supreme
writ), the court held that § 4.01 requires dismissal for failure to comply with the 60-day
notice provision. In Burdett v. Methodist Hosp., 484 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (N.D. Tex. 1980),
the court concluded that § 4.01 did not require a dismissal.
181. 652 S.W.2d at 938.
182. Id. at 938-39.
183. Id. at 939.
184. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967).
185. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, 704 F.2d 963, 967-68 (7th Cir. 1983)
(logging); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (shipping); Manufacturer's Han-
over Trust v. Alitalia Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 964, 968 (S.D.N.Y.) (airline), afl'd, 573 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1977); George v. Morgan Constr. Co., 389 F. Supp. 253, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(steel mill).
186. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514-15
(1972); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282,' 465 A.2d 294, 298-301 (1983);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676, 687-88 (1972).
187. See Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d
299, 302 (Tex. 1967); Hartfiel v. Owen, 618 S.W.2d 902, 904-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
188. 652 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983).
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Court held that section 6.02 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Im-
provement Act abrogates this common law requirement in malpractice
cases involving warnings and disclosures of risk.189 Section 6.02 provides:
In a suit against a physician or health care provider involving a health
care liability claim that is based on the failure of the physician or
health care provider to disclose or adequately to disclose the risks and
hazards involved in a medical care or surgical procedure rendered by
the physician or health care provider, the only theory on which recov-
ery may be obtained is that of negligence in failing to disclose the
risks or hazards that could have influenced a reasonable person in
making a decision to give or withhold consent.1 0
The court concluded that this provision replaced the medical standard
with a reasonable person standard for which expert testimony is not
required. 191
If the legislature intended to change the requirement of expert testi-
mony, section 6.02 is an odd way of doing it. The principal purpose of
section 6.02 arguably is to preclude theories of liability other than negli-
gence in failing to disclose risks, not to relax the requirement of expert
testimony in proving negligence. Indeed, the overall purpose of the Act
was to respond to spiraling medical malpractice insurance costs, 192 which
suggests that the legislature did not intend to relax the requirements for
recovery.
The court also noted that the Act establishes the Texas Medical Disclo-
sure Panel, which will ascertain in advance whether certain medical proce-
dures require disclosure of risks. 193 The panel's conclusion creates a
rebuttable presumption that due care requires disclosure of specific risks.
If a procedure has not been considered by the panel, physicians are under
a duty otherwise imposed by law. 194 Only in these cases does the question
of expert testimony arise. Since these cases will become less common as
the panel considers more procedures, the court's holding in Peterson will
likewise become less important.
The creation of the panel does not support the court's conclusion that
expert testimony is unnecessary in warning cases not yet considered by the
panel. Although the existence of the panel abrogates the need for expert
medical testimony in cases in which the panel has considered the proce-
dure, it does not provide that lay jurors should substitute their judgment
for that of medical experts. The panel represents a centralized, structured
attempt to determine the medical standard for warnings in advance. Its
189. Id. at 931.
190. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
191. 652 S.W.2d at 931.
192. TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02 (Vernon Supp. 1984); see Sax v. Votteler,
648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983).
193. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.03 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Medical proce-
dures are placed on one list if some disclosure is necessary and on another list if no disclo-
sure is necessary. For procedures placed on the first list, the panel determines which risks
need to be disclosed. Id. § 6.04.
194. Id. § 6.07(b).
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existence undermines rather than supports a conclusion that juries should
be permitted to second-guess established medical procedures in the context
of a specific case.
The rationales for permitting doctors, but not other industries, to set
their own standards might not apply as strongly to warning cases.195 Con-
sequently, some jurisdictions have exempted warning cases from their nor-
mal common law rule that expert testimony is needed to establish a
medical standard. 196 It is unlikely, however, that the legislature intended
such a change when it enacted the Medical Liability and Insurance Im-
provement Act.
D. Proximate Cause-Duty to Third Person
In Gooden v. Tips 197 the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident
in which the driver of the other car was under the influence of a drug that
had been prescribed by her physician. The plaintiff sued both the physi-
cian and the driver, alleging that the physician had negligently failed to
warn his patient not to drive while under the influence of the drug. The
Tyler court of appeals reversed summary judgment for the physician,
holding that "under proper facts, a physician can owe a duty to use reason-
able care to protect the driving public where the physician's negligence in
diagnosis or treatment of his patient contributes to plaintiffs injuries."'' 98
The court stated that the physician was under no duty to control the pa-
tient; at most, there was a duty to warn. 199
The court's duty analysis gives the appearance of imposing a duty where
none previously existed. The doctor was clearly under a duty to use rea-
sonable care to warn his patient of the risks associated with taking the
drug, including the danger of driving under its influence. Had the patient
sued the doctor for her injuries, there would have been no question about
the existence of a duty. The issue in Gooden was whether liability for the
physician's breach of duty extended to third-party motorists foreseeably
injured by the patient. This question presents a problem of proximate cau-
sation, involving an intervening human cause--the patient who drove
while under the influence of the drug. Since the plaintiff alleged that the
intervening human cause was foreseeable, a normal analysis of proximate
causation would extend liability to the plaintiffs injury.200
The issues of duty and proximate causation are intertwined, since both
deal with the extent of liability. Significantly, Gooden does not place the
195. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). For example, the need for
doctors to be able to rely on preexisting rules of thumb in emergencies is not as acute in
determining whether to warn a patient, and juries may be better equipped to balance the
benefits and detriments of a warning than to evaluate the propriety of a diagnostic or surgi-
cal technique.
196. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). But see Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787-88 (1976).
197. 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
198. Id. at 369.
199. Id. at 370.
200. See 3 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 40.04 (1982).
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physician under a previously unrecognized duty to warn, regardless of
whether the issue is labeled as duty or proximate causation. Gooden
merely extends liability to a foreseeable plaintiff in a situation in which the
physician allegedly breached a duty he clearly had to his patient. The
court's conclusion in Gooden is not especially novel; it merely reflects con-
ventional notions of proximate causation.201
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH
In Sanchez v. Schindler 20 2 the Texas Supreme Court overruled a long
line of Texas cases203 holding that the Texas Wrongful Death Act 20 4 limits
recovery to pecuniary damages. The court held that a parent can recover
damages for mental anguish and loss of companionship and society for the
death of his or her child.205 The court first concluded that its earlier inter-
pretation of the Wrongful Death Act, limiting recovery to pecuniary loss,
was not controlling. 206 Relying on its prior cases changing common law
tort rules, 20 7 the court concluded that it "has always endeavored to inter-
pret the laws of Texas to avoid inequity. '20 8 The fact that the legislature
had recently refused to amend the Act to include emotional loss was not
dispositive, since a "'legislature legislates by legislating . . . not by keep-
ing silent.' ",209
Chief Justice Pope argued in dissent that this approach ignores a settled
principle of statutory construction previously recognized in Cunningham v.
Cunningham210 that the legislature has adopted the judicial interpretation
of a statute when it repeatedly reenacts the statute.21I The Chief Justice
was concerned that the majority was overruling Cunningham as well as the
court's earlier opinions concerning the Wrongful Death Act, and substitut-
ing its own wisdom for that of the legislature. 21 2
201. This outcome may explain why Justice Colley, concurring, stated simply that "a
cause of action was alleged against [the physician] under existing common-law rules." 65 I
S.W.2d at 372.
202. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
203. See, e.g., J.A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327, 334-35 (Tex. 1968)
(recovery denied for sorrow, anguish, and grief from death of father and husband); Tex-
Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541, 549-51, 305 S.W.2d 162, 168-69 (1957) (child recovers
only pecuniary value of deceased mother's care); March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 (1877)
(children recover only pecuniary injury caused by father's death). The court expressly over-
ruled 20 cases in rejecting the pecuniary loss limitation on damages for the loss of a child.
651 S.W.2d at 251 n.2.
204. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1941-1983).
205. 651 S.W.2d at 251.
206. 1d. at 251-52.
207. Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. 1978) (abolishing no-duty
rule); Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam) (abolishing imminent
peril doctrine); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975) (abolishing as-
sumption of risk).
208. 651 S.W.2d at 252.
209. Id. (quoting Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (1960)).
210. 120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
211. 651 S.W.2d at 256 (quoting Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 503, 40
S.W.2d 46, 51 (1931)).
212. 651 S.W.2d at 256-57.
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After freeing itself from the Act's earlier interpretation, the court re-
jected the pecuniary loss rule, since it is based on an antiquated concept
that characterizes a child as an economic asset. 2 13 The pecuniary loss rule
rests on a more plausible ground, however, than that of a child being a
mere economic asset. Expanded liability increases insurance premiums,
and including a specific type of injury in damage awards effectively re-
quires that we insure against it. Risks that are spread roughly homogene-
ously throughout society are plausible candidates to be suffered as risks,
rather than insured against by inclusion in personal injury awards. Insur-
ing against some risks but not others may be desirable. Since most people
tend voluntarily to insure themselves against out-of-pocket pecuniary
losses, but not against emotional loss, the distinction between pecuniary
loss and emotional loss in determining recoverable damages may be valid.
This does not mean that denial of emotional damages is desirable; it
merely recognizes that the case favoring denial is more plausible than
merely viewing children as economic assets.
The court also reasoned that a parent's recovery for the loss of a child's
companionship is closely analogous to recovery for loss of consortium, for
which either spouse can recover when the other spouse has been negli-
gently injured.2 14 This analogy reveals some ambiguities in Sanchez. If
the loss of companionship due to a child's death is analogous to the loss of
consortioum for the negligent injury of a spouse, then the loss of consor-
tium for a spouse's death is an even closer analogy. Does this mean that
the court will recognize mental anguish and loss of consortium under the
Wrongful Death Act in cases involving the death of a spouse (or parent)?
Justices Ray and Kilgarlin, in a concurring opinion, indicated that they
would recognize such recovery. 2 15
Another ambiguity is whether damages for mental anguish without
physical manifestations are now recoverable. The court was not required
to resolve this issue in Sanchez because the plaintiff suffered physical in-
jury from her mental anguish. The majority does not rely on this fact,
however, and the concurring and dissenting opinions involving four jus-
tices expressly disagreed on the continuing validity of this requirement.2 1 6
A third ambiguity in Sanchez is its effect on the requirement that a
plaintiff must either have been in the zone of danger or have contempora-
neously witnessed injury to a family member in order to recover for negli-
213. Id. at 251.
214. Id. at 252; see Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978) (creating a
cause of action for either spouse for loss of consortium).
215. 651 S.W.2d at 258.
216. Compare id. at 257-58 (Pope, C.J., dissenting) (requiring proof of physical manifes-
tations); with id. at 258-59 (Ray, J., concurring) (rejecting requirement of proof of physical
manifestations). Previous case law requires proof of physical manifestations. See, e.g.,
Speier v. Webster College, 605 S.W.2d 712, 713-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), afl'din
part, 616 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1981); Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601
S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1980).
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gently caused emotional distress.217  In Sanchez the court expressly
dispensed with the zone of danger or contemporaneous viewing require-
ment,218 which might undermine these requirements in cases involving
negligent injury short of death.
Each of these ambiguities concerns the impact of Sanchez in cases in-
volving mental anguish caused by circumstances other than the death of a
child. Cases involving the wrongful death of a child may be special, how-
ever, because in many cases involving a child's death the defendant would
escape liability altogether if damages for mental anguish were not recover-
able.21 9 Cases involving injury to a child or death of a spouse or parent
normally also involve substantial pecuniary damages. Consequently,
Sanchez may be read narrowly to affect only cases involving the death of a
child. Read more broadly, however, Sanchez may affect the rules gov-
erning recovery of mental anguish in other types of cases as well.
V. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Premises Liability
In Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.220 the Texas Supreme Court held that
an occupier of land may be held liable to a business invitee who is injured
by a condition on the premises even though the occupier was neither actu-
ally nor constructively aware of the defect. In Corbin the plaintiff was
injured when he slipped on a grape on the floor of defendant's store.
Corbin alleged that the defendant negligently displayed the grapes so as to
impose a foreseeable, unreasonable risk that they would fall to the floor
and cause injury.221 The court held that the defendant's actual or con-
structive knowledge of the condition may be necessary for recovery in a
slip and fall case when the alleged negligence is a failure to remedy the
condition. When the alleged negligence is actually causing the condition,
however, such knowledge is unnecessary. 222 Language in earlier cases 223
and in section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ,224 referring to the
217. See Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ, App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ).
218. 651 S.W.2d at 254 n.6. Such a requirement in the Act would have been surprising,
since prior to Sanchez the Act was thought not to permit recovery for mental anguish at all.
219. This would not have been the case in Sanchez itself, however, since the defendant
was liable for substantial damages for the decedent's medical care and pain and suffering
under the survival statute. Id. at 250.
220. 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983).
221. The plaintiff introduced evidence that Safeway normally placed mats on the floor
under the grapes to prevent customers from slipping. No mats were present when the plain-
tiff slipped. The court held that Safeway was not automatically liable for failing to follow its
normal procedure, but its normal procedure was evidence that Safeway foresaw the risk. 1d.
at 297-98.
222. Id. at 297.
223. See Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Tex. 1972); Furr's Super
Market v. Garrett, 615 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ refd n.r.e.);
Bosquet v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 586 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965).
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defendant's knowledge of the defect, addressed the common situation in
which the alleged negligence is a mere failure to remedy the defect. These
authorities do not preclude recovery for other forms of negligence in which
the defendant creates a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of injury to its busi-
ness invitees.225
B. Release
In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft C0.226 the Texas Supreme Court held that
the choice of law applicable to determining the effect of a release is gov-
erned by the "most significant contacts" approach embodied in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, rather than by the law of the state where
the contract is made.227 After concluding that Texas law governed the re-
lease in Duncan, the court went on to hold that the release of one joint
tortfeasor does not release another joint tortfeasor unless the release specif-
ically names the other tortfeasor. 228 A general provision that releases "any
other corporations or persons whomsoever responsible . . .whether named
herein or not" 229 is insufficient to release a tortfeasor not specifically
named.
C Federal Decisions
The Fifth Circuit decided two cases involving federal law that are signif-
icant for products liability practitioners in Texas. In Wedgeworth v.
Fibreboard Corp .230 the court held that Johns-Manville's codefendants are
not entitled to a stay under the automatic stay provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code23' as a result of the stay in the actions against Johns-
Manville. In Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion232 the court vacated the Consumer Product Safety Commission's ban
on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation in residences and schools because
the ban was not supported by substantial evidence. 233
225. 648 S.W.2d at 295 (citing Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536-37
(Tex. 1975)); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978).
226. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984).
227. Id. at 216; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). In
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979), the court adopted the most significant
contacts approach to choice of law for torts. Duncan suggests that all choice of law problems
in Texas are now governed by the most significant contacts approach.
228. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 215-16.
229. Id. at 213 (emphasis added by the court).
230. 706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1983).
231. II U.S.C. § 362 (1982); see also Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F.2d 124
(4th Cir. 1983) (automatic stay not extended to solvent codefendants); Lynch v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983) (automatic stay as to defendants filing
under Bankruptcy Code not extended to solvent codefendants).
232. 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
233. 1d. at 1149-50.
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